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The Uncopyrightability of Edicts of Government
Shyamkrishna Balganesh,* and Peter S. Menell
This amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court appeal of Georgia, et al., v.
Public.Resource.Org.,explores the interplay of copyright law and the edicts of government
doctrine. The “edicts of government” doctrine was first validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
a series of nineteenth century cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine
has never been directly recognized in the express wording of the copyright statute, it is
nevertheless firmly rooted in foundational copyright principles that are themselves reflected in
the text of the statute.
Three foundational copyright principles buttress the doctrine. First, copyrightable
authorship does not extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark of edicts of
government. Authorship as requires personalization, an attribute that is antithetical to official
pronouncements of law, which are generated in an impersonal and ex officio manner. Second, all
edicts of government, as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering them uncopyrightable.
Third, authentic statements of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar as the
expression underlying edicts of government are capable of being expressed in only a limited
number of ways in order to preserve its authenticity.
Consequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) is not copyrightable. Petitioners
concede that the statutory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. The annotations
incorporated into the O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur of the state and are
therefore produced under the ostensible authority of the state, which renders them an edict of
government. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does not need to have the force of law to
qualify as an uncopyrightable edict of government. The Supreme Court’s precedents contradict
this position. Instead, faithful reading of these precedents suggest that something becomes an
uncopyrightable edict of government when it is produced under the ostensible authority of the
state and thus receives a presumptively official status, owing to its endorsement by the state. The
process by which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are adopted and merged with the
statutory content therein constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority, rendering the
O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of government.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The authors of this brief are law professors at the
University of Pennsylvania and the University of California who study and teach intellectual property law.
Their research explores the interaction between statutory law and judge-made law in the evolution of U.S.
copyright law.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The “edicts of government” doctrine was first validated by this Court in a series of nineteenth century
cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834);
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v.
Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine has
never been directly recognized in the express wording
of the copyright statute, it is nevertheless firmly rooted
in foundational copyright principles that are themselves reflected in the text of the statute.
Three foundational copyright principles buttress
the doctrine. First, copyrightable authorship does not
extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark
of edicts of government. Authorship as understood in
this Court’s jurisprudence requires personalization, an
1

Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, amici note that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel
or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amici
curiae made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Petitioner and Respondents have consented to the filing
of this brief.
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attribute that is antithetical to official pronouncements of law, which are generated in an impersonal
and ex officio manner. Second, all edicts of government,
as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering
them uncopyrightable. Third, authentic statements
of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar
as the expression underlying edicts of government are
capable of being expressed in only a limited number of
ways in order to preserve its authenticity.
Consequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.)
is not copyrightable. Petitioners concede that the statutory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. Pet.
Br. at 20. The annotations incorporated into the
O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur
of the state and are therefore produced under the ostensible authority of the state, which renders them an
edict of government.
Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does
not need to have the force of law to qualify as an uncopyrightable edict of government. This Court’s own
precedents contradict this position. Instead, faithful
reading of these precedents suggest that something becomes an uncopyrightable edict of government when it
is produced under the ostensible authority of the state
and thus receives a presumptively official status, owing to its endorsement by the state. The process by
which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are
adopted and merged with the statutory content therein
constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority,
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rendering the O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of
government.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

THE “EDICTS OF GOVERNMENT” DOCTRINE IS FIRMLY ROOTED IN FUNDAMENTAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES

The edicts of government doctrine, which denies
copyright protection to all official expositions of law, remains a well-established rule of copyright law affirmed
by this Court’s jurisprudence. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128
U.S. 244, 253-54 (1888); Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S.
617, 646-50 (1888). While the doctrine conforms to
longstanding “public policy,” Banks, 128 U.S. at 253, its
roots lie in three fundamental copyright principles reflected in the copyright statute. Contrary to what Petitioners imply, Pet. Br. 21-24, the edicts of government
doctrine are therefore fully consistent with the text of
the copyright statute. Indeed, it is demanded by copyright law principles.
A. The Official Announcement of Law Is Not
Copyrightable Authorship
Copyright protection subsists in “original works of
authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright’s requirement of authorship derives from the text of the Constitution, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, a reality that this
Court has long recognized. Burrow-Giles Lithographic
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Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-58 (1884). All the same,
the text of the copyright statute has never defined the
terms “author” or “authorship,” leaving it to courts to
construe the term consistent with the Constitution and
the Copyright Act.
This Court has understood the “author” in copyright as the actor to whom a work “owes its existence”
and as the “effective cause” of the work. Burrow-Giles,
111 U.S. at 61. Authorship thus entails a causal relationship between the actor and the work. Additionally,
authorship has been understood to entail the “personal
imprint” of an actor upon the work. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
Personalization is therefore an essential component of
copyright authorship. This personalization implies
that the personal identity of the actor responsible for
original expression is a critical consideration in treating it as a work of authorship. It is for this reason that
original expression, however creative when fixed in a
tangible medium, but nevertheless without an identifiable individual as the cause for its production, is ineligible for copyright protection as lacking authorship.
See, e.g., Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 F. 3d
955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997).
By contrast, the official announcement of laws—
otherwise referred to as the act of “promulgation”—is
an action performed ex officio. The personal, as opposed
to official, identity of the agent undertaking the action
is irrelevant to the formal status and validity of the
announcement as law. When a legislative body enacts
a law, the identities of the individual legislators
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responsible for its passage do not matter. Their personal identities are subsumed under their official role
as validly elected legislators entitled to vote on the
passage of the legislation. So it is with the exposition
of law in judicial opinions, where the personal identity
of the judge is irrelevant to the status and validity of
the opinion. The work emanates from the judiciary as
the product of constitutional and legislative authority.
The promulgation of law is therefore a fundamentally
impersonal action that is at odds with the idea of copyright authorship. This remains true of both promulgation by statutes and regulations as well as the
exposition of the laws in judicial opinions.
It is this basic disconnect between the impersonal
act of promulgation and the personal nature of authorship that formed the principal basis of the Court’s opinion in Banks: “[i]n no proper sense can the judge who,
in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head
note, be regarded as their author.” Banks, 128 U.S. at
253 (emphasis supplied). The reference to “judicial capacity” is crucial here, since in it lies the fundamental
distinction. When acting in an official judicial capacity,
the judge’s personal identity is rendered irrelevant
since the judge is speaking as a member of the court,
thereby precluding a valid claim of copyrightable authorship. Conversely, when those very portions of a
case report are prepared by an individual not acting in
a formal judicial capacity and therefore not speaking
for the court, i.e., the court reporter, they become fully
eligible for copyright protection provided they meet
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copyright’s other eligibility criteria. Callaghan, 128
U.S. at 650.
B. Legal Texts Are Methods of Operation
that Constrain Expressive Choice and
Are Ineligible for Copyright
Methods of operation are ineligible for copyright
protection under the terms of the copyright statute.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
. . . method of operation . . . , regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). This rule reflects copyright law’s
exclusion of functional expression, explained by the
Court in Baker v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99 (1880). According
to the rule and principles explained therein and since
codified in the statute, a method of operation refers to
the “means by which a person operates something.” Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F. 3d 807, 815
(1st Cir. 1995). In other words, it refers to the functional aspect of text that is directed at realizing an
identifiable result.
In Lotus v. Borland, the First Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff ’s “command menu hierarchy” was an
uncopyrightable method of operation insofar as it did
“not merely explain and present” the functionality but
instead represented the very “method by which” that
functionality was realized. Id. at 815-16. Even though
the hierarchy embodied “some expressive choices,” the
court concluded that those choices were subsumed in
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its overall functionality, thereby rendering it ineligible
for copyright. Id. at 816. That case illustrates how the
functionality underlying a method of operation may
constrain the choice of expression, rendering such expression unprotectable. The case determined that the
method of operation constrained the plaintiff ’s choice
of expression, rendering it additionally uncopyrightable. Id. at 816 (“The ‘expressive’ choices of what to
name the command terms and how to arrange them do
not magically change the uncopyrightable menu command hierarchy into copyrightable subject matter.”).
Similar considerations can pertain to situations where
“external factors” influence and dictate an actor’s
range of expression. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F. 2d 693, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega
Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510, 1522 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“functional requirements for compatibility
. . . are not protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)”).
Legal texts are methods of operation, much like an
instruction manual. They attempt to bring about particular results by controlling the behavior of citizens
through the obligatory nature of the law. And, unlike
ordinary text that has few external constraints, legal
text dictates how citizens (and other relevant actors—
e.g., government officials or courts) understand particular language and modify their behavior accordingly.
The choice of specific terms in a legal text and their
arrangement represent choices motivated entirely by
the functional purpose behind the law.
As an illustration, consider the text of a provision
in the Copyright Act dealing with attorney’s fees:
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“Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court
may also award a reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. The
text of this provision contains expression. Yet, its verbiage and structure are dictated entirely by the result
that it seeks to communicate, defining a court’s discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. The first part of the
sentence renders the provision subject to the rest of
the statute, and its use of the term “may” (instead of
“shall”) confirms a court’s discretion in making awards.
To be sure, each of the provision’s terms and phrases
has English language synonyms, but as choices made
in creating a legal directive they reflect the constraints
of external purpose—communicating the grant of this
power to courts—rather than any literary flourish.
Those circumstances render such expression ineligible
for copyright.
This Court in Banks recognized both the functional nature of the expression at issue as well as the
constraint on expressive choices that it produced. As
the opinion captured the matter, “[t]he whole work
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition
and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” Banks, 128 U.S. at
253-54 (emphasis supplied). Petitioners misinterpret
the reference to “binding” to mean that a legal text
must have the “force of law” to qualify as a government
edict. See infra pp. 12-18. The reference to the law
“binding every citizen” is instead a recognition of the
innately functional nature of government edicts, regardless of their precise source. The judge’s work in
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ensuring the “authentic exposition” of the law in turn
implies a constraint—on form and verbiage—that accompanies the production of government edicts, rendering them ineligible for copyright protection.
C. Authentic Statements of Law Entail the
Merger of Idea and Expression
As a related matter, the “authentic[ity]” in “exposition” of the law accompanying a government edict entails the merger of expression and idea, rendering it
further ineligible for copyright protection. A natural
corollary to copyright’s rule disfavoring protection for
functional expression, the merger doctrine denies protection “when the uncopyrightable subject matter is
very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily requires,’ . . .
if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number.” Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company, 379
F. 2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). “When the ‘idea’ and
its ‘expression’ are thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred.” Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971).
Government edicts purport to be authentic pronouncements of law, whether they be judicial opinions,
legislative statutes, or administrative regulations. Judicial opinions expounding or interpreting “the law”
choose expression that reflect the judge’s understanding of the law, be it statutory or common law. Statutes
and regulations, in turn, declare “the law” in their
very text. This commitment to authenticity severely
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circumscribes the value in any expressive variation
that might be introduced in subsequent expositions of
the law. Any restatement of the law using expression
that is different from the words used in the government edict risks undermining its meaning and authenticity as a binding statement of law.
Consider another section of the Copyright Act: “No
civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of
this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507. A creative and
perhaps more efficient restatement of this provision
reads: “A maintainable civil action under this title
must be commenced within three years from the accrual of the claim.” To most people reading the restatement, it may well communicate the same meaning as
the actual statutory text. Nonetheless, the restatement
is no longer an authentic statement of the law. By altering the wording and structure of the original provision, it introduces new terminology and therefore
abandons its authenticity as an authoritative statement of the law. It thereupon loses its formal status as
such. This Court is intimately familiar with the importance of statutory and jurisprudential wording to
the explication of law.
It is this analytic dimension that the merger doctrine captures in relation to government edicts. An
edict’s commitment to authenticity in exposition, a prerequisite for its binding nature as “law,” necessitates
verbatim wording, implying that the “law” contained in
the edict is only ever capable of expression in one or a
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limited number of ways, effectively merging the law
and its exposition.
***
Consequently, the government edicts doctrine
finds support in fundamental copyright doctrines.
Copyright’s authorship, functionality, and merger collectively buttress the government edicts doctrine by
rendering edicts of government uncopyrightable.
II.

THE OFFICIAL CODE OF GEORGIA ANNOTATED (O.C.G.A.) IS AN UNCOPYRIGHTABLE EDICT OF GOVERNMENT

The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is published by the State of Georgia and is the only compilation of the state’s official statutory code that is publicly
available. It consists of the state code enacted by the
legislature along with annotations prepared by the
publisher, both of which are merged into a common volume. O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1. The annotations comprise “such
materials as summaries of judicial decisions interpreting or applying particular statutes.” Pet. Br. at 2.
Petitioners concede that the statute itself is uncopyrightable as an edict of government. Id. at 2-3. At
issue is the copyrightability of the annotations. While
created by a private party under direction from the
state, the annotations do not have the force of law
as such. See O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7. They are nevertheless
adopted through a formal vote of the state legislature,
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merged with the statute, and collectively published “by
authority of the state.” O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1.
Although the annotations do not have the force of
law and are therefore not binding as such, they nonetheless fall within the edicts of government doctrine.
They are prepared under the direction of the legislature, and their adoption and merger into the enacted
statute reveals that they are created under the ostensible authority of the state, making them uncopyrightable edicts of government.
A. An Edict of Government Does Not Need
to Have the Force of Law
Without any basis in precedent or the statute, Petitioners contend that in order to qualify as an edict of
government under the doctrine as developed by this
Court, the edict must have the “force of law.” Pet. Br. at
32. As Respondent rightly notes, this argument flies in
the face of the very precedent upon which Petitioners
rely and introduces an artificial constraint into the
working of the doctrine, leading to absurd results.
Resp. Br. at 40.
While Petitionesr rightly note that the Court’s
opinion in Wheaton has been understood as recognizing that the annotations at issue in the case were
copyrightable, it mistakenly concludes that this was
because those annotations lacked binding effect. Pet.
Br. at 33. As Respondent correctly argues in its account
of the history surrounding Wheaton and the parties’
positions therein, the reason had to do with the
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manner in which those notes and annotations were
prepared in the case. Insofar as they were not prepared
by the judges themselves but instead independently
by the court reporter, they were seen as the legitimate
result of the reporter’s own creative effort, despite
lacking any binding effect as law. Resp. Br. at 24-26.
Indeed, this understanding informed this Court’s
twin opinions in Banks and Callaghan, authored by
the same justice within the same month. In the latter
of the two cases, Justice Samuel Blatchford’s opinion
allowed the court reporter to assert a copyright claim
in parts of the report that went beyond the “opinions of
the judges”. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647. That case read
Wheaton and its subsequent remand to stand for the
proposition that the elements of the reports “not embracing the written opinions of the court, namely, the
title-page, table of cases, head-notes, statements of
facts, arguments of counsel, and index . . . may be the
lawful subject of copyright.” Id. at 649. Yet some weeks
earlier, Justice Blatchford’s opinion denied the copyrightability of not just the judicial opinions themselves, but also the statements of cases, syllabi, and
headnotes. Banks, 128 U.S. at 253. The reasoning was
simple: Unlike in Callaghan, the statements of cases,
syllabi, and headnotes that went into the reports in
Banks were prepared by the judges themselves rather
than by the court reporter. Id. at 251.
Banks underlines this point through its repeated
emphasis on the work actually performed by a judge.
This Court considered the point obvious when it
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emphasized that “[in] no proper sense can the judge
who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or
decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or
head note, be regarded as their author or their proprietor.” Id. at 253. The work of a judge was the key determinant.
Judges . . . can themselves have no pecuniary
interest or proprietorship, as against the
public at large, in the fruits of their judicial
labors. This extends to whatever work they perform in their capacity as judges, and as well to
the statements of cases and head notes prepared by them as such, as to the opinions and
decisions themselves.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Banks specifies that, in its answer to plaintiff ’s
bill, the defendant elaborated on the role of the court
reporter in the state of Ohio at the time. The answer
averred that the opinions constituting the reports
were exclusively the work of the judges composing those courts; that the reporter performed no work in preparing the said opinions
and decisions; that it is the universal custom
and practice of those courts that the judge to
whom the duty is assigned of preparing the
opinion, prepares not only the opinion but also
the statement of the case and the syllabus, the
latter being subject to revision by the judges
concurring in the opinion; that the reporter
takes no part, and performs no labor, in preparing the syllabus, the statement of the case
and the opinion.
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Id. at 250. Banks based its decision on the uncopyrightability of the opinions in principal part on these facts,
which have all to do with the judicial origins of the uncopyrightable elements and nothing whatsoever to do
with their binding nature. See id. at 251.
Petitioners base its argument on the sole use of
the phrase “binding every citizen” used by Banks in
conjunction with “the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law.” Id. at 253; Pet. Br. at 40. By
cherry-picking this phrase and using it out of context,
Petitioner ignores its origins altogether. As the opinion
in Banks makes clear through citation, this phrase
originates in the Massachusetts case of Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886), decided two years before
Banks and Callaghan.
While Nash raised questions about the copyrightability of judicial opinions and the scope of such copyright, the court chose to decide the case on “a narrower
question” of interpreting the contract between the
state and the publisher to see if that contract had conferred upon the publisher the right to prevent others
from making the opinions public until they were first
published by them. Nash, 6 N.E. at 560. And to inform
its analysis, Nash observed:
The decisions and opinions of the justices are
the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all
the citizens. They declare the unwritten law,
and construe and declare the meaning of the
statutes. Every citizen is presumed to know
the law thus declared, and it needs no
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argument to show that justice requires that
all should have free access to the opinions,
and that it is against sound public policy to
prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the
earliest knowledge of the public the statutes,
or the decisions and opinions of the justices.
. . . It can hardly be contended that it would
be within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact that the statutes and opinions should not be made known to the public.
Id.
The reference to “binding” was therefore an explanation for the court’s conclusion that the legislature
had an obligation to publicize its laws, both judgemade and statutory. Indeed, Justice Blatchford uses it
as such in Banks, since it follows on the heels of his
reference to “public policy,” which was precisely the
basis for the court’s non-copyright decision in Nash.
Banks, 128 U.S. at 253. Petitioners miss this lineage
altogether in its simplistic attempt to bootstrap the
idea of “binding law” into the edicts of government doctrine.
Appreciating this nuance is critical to understanding Justice Blatchford’s opinions in Banks and Callaghan, since he was acutely aware of the role that court
reporters played in the preparation of case reports.
Justice Blatchford himself served as a court reporter
to the courts in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Second
Circuit and simultaneously published Blatchford’s Circuit Court Reports between 1852 and 1888. See Hector
T. Fenton, Mr. Justice Blatchford. In Memoriam, 41 Am.
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L. Reg. 882, 882-83 (1893). And in this capacity, he produced the report for the leading New York decision on
the copyrightability of judicial opinions, Little v. Gould,
15 F. Cas. 604, 612 n.1 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (“Reported
by Samuel Blatchford, Esq., and here reprinted by permission.”).
At issue in Little was a New York statute that forbade any assertions of copyright in the judicial decisions of the court of appeals, and further vested the
copyright in “any notes or references made by the
state reporter” in the state, for public benefit. Id. at
608. The question in the case revolved around understanding what these “notes and references” could be
and whether it encompassed content produced by a
court reporter entirely gratuitously, and without obligation. The court in Little answered this question in
the negative, concluding that the phrase “notes and
references” was limited to those portions of the reports
“constituting an essential ingredient of their integral
composition, and which the state reporter, as such, was
therefore bound to supply.” Id. at 609. These included
the “summary of the points decided by the court,” “the
footnotes” therein, and the summary of the parties’ arguments—all prepared by the court reporter. Id. Outside of this phrase were the “abstracts of the pleadings
and statements of facts,” which formed the basis of the
opinions themselves and anything else that the reporter included. Id. at 610.
While Little was based on a state statute, the
court’s attempt to differentiate between the copyrightable and uncopyrightable parts of a reporter’s work
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was driven entirely by the official function of the court
reporter. Nowhere does the court tie the copyrightability of a part of the report, or indeed its lack thereof, to
the question of whether that part is binding. Gratuitously, as opposed to obligatorily, produced elements of
the court report were copyrightable by the court reporter because they were in no sense part of the opinion, nor of the “notes and references” accompanying it.
The demarcation at issue in Little formed the basis of Justice Blatchford’s reasoning in Callaghan, allowing the copyrightability of those parts of the reports
prepared entirely by a court reporter. This influence is
borne out in the Callaghan opinion’s reference to the
“absence of a prohibitory statute” which was being interpreted in Little. See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647.
Without such a prohibition, all elements of a case report produced by a court reporter are rendered copyrightable, including those generated in the exercise of
the reporter’s official functions. Nothing whatsoever
turns on whether the elements are binding and have
the force of law as such.
Petitioner’s argument about the need for an edict
of government to have the “force of law” is therefore
clearly contradicted by the reasoning in Banks and
Manchester. Consequently, the mere fact that the annotations merged into the O.C.G.A. lack the force of
law has no bearing whatsoever on the conclusion that
the O.C.G.A. as a whole constitutes an uncopyrightable
edict of government.
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B. Annotations Produced under the Ostensible Authority of the State Qualify as
Edicts of Government
While the annotations merged into the O.C.G.A.
are declared by the terms of the O.C.G.A. to lack the
force of law, they are nevertheless merged into the statute through a formal vote of the Georgia legislature.
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1. Petitioners argue that this vote and
adoption is functionally meaningless in relation to the
edicts of government doctrine since the annotations
were not individually voted on, and thus never go
through the formal legislative process. Pet. Br. at 40.
While the process does not convert the annotations
into law, it nonetheless implicates the edicts of government doctrine, which applies to all annotations and
statements of law produced under the ostensible authority of the state.
In its brief, the United States clearly recognizes
the flaw in Petitioners’ argument that a work must
have the “force of law” to qualify as an edict of government. U.S. Br. at 24 n.6. In its place, it suggests an alternative formulation: to qualify as a government
edict, the expression at issue must have been prepared
by the individual in “his capacity as a lawmaker.” Id.
at 21. The United States further suggests adopting an
expansive framework encompassing the “whole work”
of the individual in order to make this determination,
thereby covering not just a legislator’s immediate actions in voting to pass a bill, but also “materials produced as a legislator discharging his lawmaking
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duties.” Id. While this approach fares better than Petitioners’ argument, it too is fraught with difficulties.
The government’s test effectively boils down to
determining whether the expression at issue was produced in a lawmaking capacity. In illustrating the
working of the test, the government chooses easy examples. Id. at 21. In applying its test to the O.C.G.A.,
the government nevertheless concludes that the
O.C.G.A. was not produced by the legislature in a lawmaking capacity because of differences between the
process through which the O.C.G.A. is formally
adopted and the process of enacting legislation in
Georgia. Id. at 23-31.
Indeed, the government’s application of its own
test to the O.C.G.A. illustrates the problems with its
test. While the process through which the O.C.G.A. is
voted on, adopted as official, and merged into the rest
of the statute may be formally distinct from the state’s
standard legislative process, the difference is meaningless to readers and users of the O.C.G.A. attempting to
determine the relevant statutory rule of the state, and
reproduce it if and when needed. To users of the
O.C.G.A., the work on its face bears the imprimatur of
the state, epitomized in the annotations being contained in a volume captioned “Official.”
To have ordinary citizens distinguish between the
legislature’s different processes in assessing the copyrightability of an edict would impose an undue hardship on the public and users of the law. This is
especially the case given the absence of any common
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understanding of “lawmaking capacity,” as assumed by
the government. The question of copyrightability (of a
government edict) would now come to be tied to an
awareness of the lawmaking body’s different procedures, and the differential effects of those procedures
on the product coming out of that body. The government’s proposed test is therefore unworkable in practice.
Respondent recognizes the deficiencies in both Petitioners’ and the government’s tests and in its place
offers an alternative: to qualify as an edict of government, the work must be prepared in the exercise of
“state legal authority.” Resp. Br. at 17, 22. Respondent’s
test represents a workable formulation in large part,
but it can be read as requiring the exercise of actual
legal authority granted to the creator of the edict by
the state. In this reading, once again the informational
burden on users of the edict would be high, who would
have to now investigate the scope and extent of such
authority.
A minor modification to Respondent’s proposed
rule represents a fully workable alternative and is
compatible with the precedents at hand: edicts of government are prepared in the exercise of ostensible authority of the state. In situations where an edict holds
itself out as having been created under the authority
of the state, regardless of whether it was actually produced under the authority of the state, it qualifies as
an uncopyrightable edict of government. This rule
would cover both situations where there is actual authority, as well as those where such formal authority is
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lacking but the state nevertheless acquiesces in the
work representing itself as having the imprimatur of
the state, as is the case with the O.C.G.A.
Both Banks and Callaghan are consistent with
this approach. As evidenced by the language of the
Court in Callaghan, the work of the reporter was readily identifiable in case reports and understood widely
to carry no authority of the state. Callaghan, 128 U.S.
at 645 (referring to the “usual form” of law reports). It
was only in the rare case that judges—carrying the authority of the state—produced parts of the report other
than the opinions, which altered this understanding
and rendered the work uncopyrightable as an edict.
See, e.g., Banks, 128 U.S. at 251.
Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898) was the
first case extending the edicts of government doctrine
to statutes and is also consistent with this understanding. The case involved an annotated compilation of
Michigan state statutes prepared by the plaintiff, Howell. Id. at 130. Shortly after its compilation, the state
legislature passed a law declaring that “the general
laws of the state, as collected and arranged in those
volumes, should be received and admitted in all courts
and proceedings, and by all officers, ‘as evidence of the
existing laws thereof, with like effect as if published
under and by the authority of the state.’ ” Id. at 131. As
Respondent notes in its brief, the legislature merely issued its imprimatur to the general laws of the state
contained in the plaintiff ’s compilations, and not to
everything contained therein, including the additional
material prepared by the plaintiff. Resp. Br. at 34-35.
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The court concluded that the plaintiff ’s annotations
were copyrightable works, even though the statutory
component of the compilation was an uncopyrightable
government edict. See Howell, 91 F. at 138.
On the facts of Howell, the state legislature was
circumspect to only authenticate the “general laws” as
“collected and arranged” by the plaintiff, even though
it noted that the book contained those laws “compiled
and annotated.” 2 HOWELL’S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF
MICHIGAN iv (1883). The state, in other words, consciously disavowed authenticating the plaintiff ’s annotations. Neither the state of Michigan, nor Howell,
therefore held out the annotations as ever garnering
the imprimatur of the state. Indeed, Howell accurately
reproduced the exact wording of the authenticating
statute in his volume, thereby effectively avoiding the
possibility of any exercise of ostensible authority.
The annotations in the O.C.G.A., by contrast, do
just the opposite. They hold themselves out as having
obtained the endorsement of the state legislature, even
while disclaiming any binding status as law. In so doing, they should be treated as uncopyrightable.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed.
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